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Abstract  The GATT has not pressed hard for policy liberali-
zation  by the  less developed  countries  in previous Unilateral liberalization of U.S. peanut policy was  tion  the leed  countres in prevos
evaluated  using a model of U.S. and world peanut  negotiations, so the United States cannot expect the evaluated  using  a  model of U.S.  and world  ....  pau  current talks to assure liberalization by its competi- supply  and  demand.  Under  the  proposed  policy,  cuent talks to assue libealization by its competi-
world peanut price would  rise slightly to $20  per  tors in peanut exports. China, the largest producer of
world  peanut price  would  r  ise  slightly  to  $.20 per  peanuts, is not a member of GATT.1 Still, the United pound at the U.S. farm level. U.S. production would  peanuts, isnotamemberofGATT.  Still, the United
decline by 578 million pounds per year and would  States might undertake unilateral liberalization of its decline by 578 million pounds per year and  would
be offset by imports of 582 million pounds. U.S. net  ownprogramaspartof a generalresponse.  Policy imp *  Oh  * *  ~~makers  might want to balance commitments to pea- farm income  would fall by  $405 million per  year.  might want to balance commitments to pea-
Lost  income  wper  farm wold be $21 000 per year  nut production and processing in the face of liberali- Lost  income per  farm would  be $21,000  per  year
zation in other markets. while  the average  outlay  of consumers  would  de-  T  e 
crease by $.84  per person at farm level price. Gov-  Thus, the objective of this study was to estimate
ernment expenditures would be virtually unchanged  how  U.S.  producers  and  consumers  would  be  af-
because of the market orientation of current policy.  fected by unilateral removal of the U.S. peanut pro-
gram. The existing U.S. peanut program is described
Key words:  trade  liberalizvia  a set  of supply and demand schedules derived
Key  supplyi demandr n,  PSE  polifrom  existing measures of elasticities applied to re-
'supply,  demand, PSE  cently  observed price and quantity data. Price and
Both  domesticdthe 1990arevenue  flows are the focus of the impact measures.
oth the domestic debate over the  1990 Farm Bill  Estimates  of the level of government  intervention and  the  international  negotiations  concerning  the  fcate  of  the  ernent  intervention
General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade  (GATT)m 
have  focused  attention  on  the  effects  that  would  policies of other countries  and with U.S.  programs
for other commodities. result from reducing government programs that sub-
sidize U.S. agriculture.  The Farm Bill considers re-  STRCTR  OF  PA  T P
ducing  government  participation  as  a  way  to
improve net welfare and to reduce government costs.  Passage of the 1977 Farm Bill initiated a marketing
The trade negotiations  share these motivations, and  policy for peanuts that is unique  among U.S. com-
are also seeking to define and distribute the respon-  modity programs. Peanut marketing policy achieves
sibilities  for  liberalization  among  countries.  U.S.  significant  price and income support through a pol-
peanut programs, featuring market quotas, price sup-  icy of market discrimination that is virtually costless
ports, and import quotas, do not require large trans-  to taxpayers  when the policy is correctly adminis-
fers from the Federal  budget,  so they receive  little  tered. Often called a two-tier price support, the pol-
pressure for change  on the basis of lightening  the  icy is  capable of achieving at least  three levels  of
taxpayer burden (Carley and Fletcher).  Peanut pro-  market discrimination.  The policy is often regarded
grams of competing nations are under less pressure  as market-oriented  because it seeks to  serve  each
for reform than are programs of most temperate zone  sub-market of the total peanut market at the highest
commodities  because  the  major  producers,  other  price attainable in that particular sub-market. Thus,
than the United States, are less developed countries  in order for the policy to be successful, the sub-mar-
(Table  1).  kets must be independent,  that is,  have little inter-
China has applied for membership and currently has observer status in the GATT talks.
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153Table  1.  Peanut Exports (1,000 Metric Tons)
1980/81  1981/82  1982/83  1983/84  1984/85  1985/86  1986/87  1987/88
United States  228  261  309  337  390  473  329  363
China  305  125  160  160  139  313  235  250
Argentina  74  64  111  121  117  150  215  193
Hong Kong  52  75  56  22  30  55  50  50
Sudan  133  131  70  51  15  11  10  10
South Africa  52  39  5  6  47  21  15  20
India  71  46  35  60  40  15  40  40
Brazil  37  -19  13  12  20  12  20  10
Other  190  215  257  193  225  259  248  262
Total  1,142  975  1,016  962  1,023  1,309  1,162  1,198
Source: U.  S.  Department of Agriculture,  Foreign Agricultural Service.
market trade. Tomek and Robinson  (1981)  refer to  The domestic quota limits the amount of peanuts
these conditions as third degree price discrimination.  that can be sold in the domestic market at the support
At least since 1977 the principal sub-markets  for  price, but places no limits on production. Total pro-
U.S. peanuts, broadly classified  as domestic edible,  duction of peanuts  adjusts to world conditions. Im-
export edible, and domestic oil, have generally been  portant CCC rules govern trade and affect the price
independent. The flow of U.S. peanuts to these mar-  discovery process. Two of the most important con-
kets  is  described  in  Figure  1. Independence  is  ditions are (1) the deadline, September 15, for peanut
achieved primarily through application of Section 22  buyers to forward contract with farmers, and (2) the
of  the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  of  1933  as  CCC minimum resale price for peanuts  stocks  ac-
amended  in 1935,  and various trading  rules of the  quired from farmers who do not sign forward con-
Farm  Bills  of  1977,  1981,  and  1985.  Section  22,  tracts. Peanuts grown in excess of domestic quota are
approved by the GATT in  1955, prohibits  import of  designated  as additional peanuts  and  are normally
peanuts  into the U.S.  economy  except for research  sold in the export market on contracts signed with
and development purposes (1.7 million pounds cur-  farmers prior to September 15. This rule also extends
rently).2 Most recent Commodity Credit Corporation  to export products, such as peanut butter, which may
(CCC) rules prescribe that U.S. peanuts marketed for  be produced  in the United  States using  additional
domestic use in excess  of domestic  quota  shall be  peanuts.  Additional  peanuts not contracted for sale
subject to a penalty of 140 percent of the quota price  prior to September 15 must be delivered to the CCC.
support rate. The penalty price is a high level of price  CCC  stocks may be sold for export at a minimum
discrimination but provides an acceptable marketing  resale price, or they may be sold for unrestricted use
alternative  in  circumstances  of short  supply.  A  in crushing. A little used, but potentially  important,
drought could, for example, push prices to point A  rule is that additional peanuts  may be bought from
in Figure 2.  the  CCC  for  use  in the  domestic  market.  These
The  cornerstone  of market  segregation and sub-  peanuts, known as buybacks,  have the potential to
sequent price discrimination policy is the quota sup-  raise  domestic  consumption  above  the  domestic
port price for  domestic peanuts.  To be successful,  quota. Farmers receive a share of profits from CCC
this price must be set at a point (say, point B in Figure  resale of peanuts but are not liable for losses.
2) on the aggregate U.S. farm level demand curve for  The logic of the buyback relates to the possibility
peanuts  corresponding  to  U.S. edible consumption  of setting the domestic quota too low. A low domes-
(peanut butter, confections,  and seed) with perhaps  tic quota  would  pressure  domestic  prices  to  rise,
a small margin for shortfalls in delivery. Setting this  reduce export contracts, and increase the likelihood
quota too low with respect to the support price will  that additionals  delivered to CCC might be bought
cause a loss of buffer stocks and a subsequent rise in  back for  domestic  use.  Dubman  and  Miller  have
domestic market price above the support level.  discussed  the negative  impact  this would have  on
2The logic for Section 22 was that peanut imports should be prohibited because imports would significantly disrupt the domestic
market for peanuts.  This argument was the subject of debate during  1990-91  hearings by the International  Trade Commission.
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Figure 1.  Major Market Channels in the  U.S. Peanut Market
Note: A sheller and a buying point may be the same. Other potential channels  are highly restricted by import quota, ex-
port constraints on dumping peanuts on the world market in the form of oil, constraints on  re-importing export peanuts
(including  penalties), and constraints on the CCC  as a competitor enterprise in the marketing channl. Shellers and do-
mestic processors hold inventories, but inventory change is not a major flow in most years.
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p = farm price
q = quantity of farmers'  stock peanuts
A = penalty price for using non-quota  peanuts  in U.S.  market
B = domestic  CCC quota loan price
C  =  CCC resale price for uncontracted  additional peanuts
D = free market world price for contract  additional peanuts
E = U.S.  and  world price for peanut crushing
F = CCC loan price for additional peanuts
Figure 2.  Principal Sub-Markets for Farmers' Stock Peanuts in the U.S. Peanut Program
155export  trade. Buyback for domestic crushing could  domestic  and  external  prices  (USDA  ERS  April,
compete  with the export market.  A significant in-  1989).  Because  the first source plainly yields little
crease in domestic consumption using buybacks is  information on the effects of peanut policy, the re-
evidence that the current level of the domestic quota  mainder of this report examines the effects of market
is too low for efficient operation of the program. The  discrimination on the world market for peanuts.
buyback is a virtual litmus test of whether the quota  A PSE price  wedge  calculated  as the difference
and support  price  are at the right point (say,  B in  between  the  world  price  and  the  U.S.  price  will
Figure 2) on the domestic market demand curve.  overestimate the value of the producer subsidy. The
Domestic  price support  is  carried  out primarily  United  States  acts as  a  price  leader  in the  world
through  non-recourse,  warehouse-storage  loans  to  market.  If U.S.  export prices  are  subsidized  they
approved  grower  associations  acting  for  farmers.  would likely rise if the program were dissolved, thus
Setting  the  quota  and  support  prices  correctly  in  leading to a rise in world prices. Although the United
relation to domestic demand will make it inefficient  States  produces  only  about  10  percent  of world
to deliver domestic peanuts for CCC storage.  Shel-  peanut  production,  in recent years  it has  claimed
lers will  find  it efficient to pay  farmers the price  about  35 percent of the market for world  exports.3
support or a higher price,  depending on scarcity  of  Thus,  it is not possible to observe  an independent
shelled grades required in sheller forward contracts,  world  reference  price  as  theoretically  required  to
to  avoid  paying  interest  and  carrying  charges  re-  construct  price  wedges  using  the  conventional
quired to buy peanuts from the loan program.  Thus,  PSE/CSE  methodology.  PSE  and  CSE  estimates
little or no government costs are expected, and costs  should be made from estimates of the price wedges
have been low in recent years.  between observed prices and expected world  equi-
Peanut oil can be imported by the United States but  librium prices in the absence of a U.S. program.
the domestic quota that is crushed for oil may not be  Discriminatory marketing and some representative
sold (dumped) on the world market. The result is a  price levels for  1987  are shown in Figure  2 which
dampening effect on the U.S. oil market. This is the  describes representative parameters of the U.S. pro-
major source of losses for the program but one that  gram.  In  1987, the penalty for marketing domestic
results in a subsidy for consumers  of peanut oil.  peanuts  produced  for export contracts  would  have
The consumer subsidy is small because of relative  been $.425 per pound (Point A) based on a national
success in applying market discrimination. Average  average support level of $.3076 per pound (Point B)
government costs have been approximately  10 mil-  for  domestic  quota.  When  domestic  use  exceeds
lion dollars per year during the past five years. Pro-  available quota, that is, when the domestic quota (or
jected costs in 1988/89 are only one million dollars  domestic quota production) lies to the left of point B
(Carley and Fletcher).  Average U.S. peanut produc-  on the domestic sub-market demand curve, then free
tion  in  the  same  period  approached  four  billion  market prices prevail. Under these conditions, export
pounds, resulting in a government cost per thousand  contracts  might be renegotiated and sold in the do-
pounds of approximately twenty-five cents. Govern-  mestic  market  if  prices  exceed  $.425  per  pound
ment costs are, thus, not appropriate for measuring  (Point A, Figure 2).  Given a significant shortage of
the subsidy  effects of the  U.S.  peanut program.  A  quota,  both penalty  and domestic quota might sell
better approach to subsidy measurement is to exam-  well above  $.425  per pound.  Some peanuts  at the
ine the price gaps occurring between U.S. and world  farm level (farmers' stock) sold at a price above $.50
prices resulting from market discrimination.  per pound  in  1980  when only  about 700,000  tons
were available for domestic use.  A more likely sce-
SUBSIDY  EQUIVALENTS  FOR  nario occurred in 1988 when the domestic quota was
~U. S.  PEANUTS  ~2,808.4  million pounds and production was expected
Producer  subsidy  equivalents  (PSEs)  and  con-  to be nearly 4,000 million pounds. In this case, about
sumer subsidy equivalents (CSEs) show the change  2,544  million pounds of quota were used for food,
in producer  (or consumer)  revenue due (or cost) to  seed,  and related uses  at prices  near support price
government  actions.  Subsidy  equivalents  may  be  (Point B).  The  remaining  336  million pounds  of
calculated from two sources:  (1) government expen-  quota were sold to U.S. crushers in the oil sub-mar-
ditures, and (2) the price wedge that a policy instru-  ket for $. 125 per pound (Point E). Only in an excep-
ment  (or  mix  of  instruments)  drives  between  tional production year would crushing  price fall to
3The U.S.  share of the high-value confections  market is probably much higher although it it difficult to document because most
countries do not report confections  separately from oil stock. The U.S.  share of the world oil market is negligible because of the high
quality and scarcity of additional  peanuts available  to the world market.
156$.0745  per  pound  (Point F)  which is the  national  good production year, it is possible for peanuts of a
average  support price for  additional  peanuts.  The  similar quality to sell at price levels B, C, D, and E,
export  and  domestic  oil  sub-markets  will  remain  or even F, if yields are exceptionally high. The im-
separate because the United States does not allow  port constraint  (Section  22)  and the  penalty  price
dumping  of oil from domestic crush on the world  (Point A) keep the export edible sub-market  inde-
market.  pendent of U.S. oil and domestic edible trade.
Export  edible  prices  are  usually  established  at  To estimate the world price that results from trade
world prices which are about $.18 per pound (Point  liberalization, the three sub-markets must be aggre-
D).  However,  because  of the dynamics  of  export  gated  to  a  single  farm  level  demand  (Figure  3).
contracting,  some peanuts  uncontracted  before the  Aggregate  demand  (horizontal  summation  of  the
September  15  deadline and  delivered  to  the CCC  sub-markets  in Figure 2) may then be compared to
may sell  at the minimum  resale price of $.20 per  aggregate U.S. supply response and to world supply
pound  (Point  C). Point C  should be set above ex-  and demand as conceptualized in Figure 4.
pected  world  price  to  avoid  delivery  to  the CCC.
Export edible peanuts are usually of a much higher  A MODEL OF THE PEANUT MARKET
quality than are the relatively small amount of pea-  The  wedge  between  the  world  price  after  U.S.
nuts sold in the world oil market, allowing the world  liberalization  and the observed  U.S. price  is illus-
edible and  oil markets  to operate  similarly  but at  trated in Figure 4 and later estimated from available
different price levels based on the quality  differen-  elasticities and data describing U.S. and world sup-
tial. However, because of the contract deadline and  ply  and demand.4 U.S.  prices from discriminatory
uncertainty  of production  resulting in  high yields,  markets  are  located  on the price  axis  and  a new
the peanut program might force some high quality,  concept is introduced as the rental value (RV) wedge
uncontracted  peanuts to be sold for world crush at  (Pf to Fp in Figure 4). The RV wedge, as opposed to
the discriminatory  lower price (Point E). Thus,  in a  the PSE wedge,  represents the difference  between
Discriminatory  price schedule
P  A =  penalty price for using  non-quota peanuts  in U.S. market
B  = domestic  CCC quota loan price
C  = CCC resale price for uncontracted  additional peanuts
D = free market world price for contract  additional peanuts
A  E - U.S.  and world price for peanut crushing








Figure 3.  Demand of  Farmers' Stock Peanuts
4Figure 4 is not drawn to scale as its purpose is to present some testable hypotheses about world trade in peanuts.
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United States  Rest of World
B  = quota  support price  Pf = weighted average price received by farmers
D = world price  under  current policies
E = U.S.  peanut oil price  Fp = world free trade prices after  liberalization
Figure 4.  Conceptual  Model  of Producer Subsidy Equivalent and Rental Value Wedge
the average price  received by U.S. farmers and the  using U.S. peanuts are subsidized by the positive net
price they would receive after unilateral trade liber-  CSE  wedge from point E to the free trade price at
alization, that is, the price that results if Section 22  point Fp. Likewise, the peanut program imposes the
is abandoned to permit imports into the United States  world  wedge  as  an implicit  tax  on farmers  and  a
and if the U.S. price support program is abolished.  positive net CSE wedge for rest of world buyers. All
The RV wedge models the rent foregone between  prices in the discriminatory markets collapse to price
the subsidized  price  that U.S.  farmers  receive  as a  Fp  in the absence  of a program.  The RV  wedge,
benefit of the program  and the resulting free trade  which  is the weighted sum of taxes and subsidies,
price.  When based on existing international prices,  will  likewise collapse  (average  farm price  falls  to
the  PSE wedge  (Pf to  D)  overestimates  this  rent  Point Fp) and represents a significant loss of revenue
because the PSE price wedge is the sum of RV and  for peanut farmers who own quota. The distribution
the world wedge.  The RV wedge,  when computed  of revenue losses and gains is described later show-
by  a world  model,  should  be within  the range of  ing  that  RV  wedge  losses are  absorbed  by a  few
observed  prices  paid by  farmers  to  rent domestic  thousand producers,  whereas  the implicit  net CSE
quota from absentee  owners.  About 47  percent of  tax  on  domestic  edibles  is  paid  in  significantly
quota is rented and provides  a significant data base  smaller amounts by each of millions of consumers.
for comparison (Carley and Fletcher).  In this model, the rest-of-the-world (ROW) aggre-
CSE wedges can also be based on net results of free  gate demand excludes the excess demand serviced
trade. These are not drawn but are easily measured  by U.S. supply. The United States is not only a price
on the price axes by inserting the principal discrimi-  leader, but U.S. quality  causes U.S. peanuts to be a
natory  market prices.  The distance  from point  B,  differentiated  product (USDA FAS). As a result, the
Figure 4, to Fp  (the price after U.S.  liberalization)  U.S.  is expected to both import and export peanuts
represents  a negative  net CSE price wedge paid as  in  a  liberalized  trade  market.  The  United  States
an implicit tax by U.S. buyers of domestic quota. The  captures  a significant share of current  world  trade
RV  price  wedge  is  smaller  than the  CSE  wedge  under current market conditions. An expected small
because U.S.  farmers must respond to the weighted  increase  in  export  price  would  likely  allow  the
average  of domestic support price and lower prices  United  States to  retain some of this export  market
for  additional  production.  However,  buyers  of oil  while  lower  consumer  prices  would  attract  more
158U.S. buyers than would be supplied by the remaining  where all quantities and prices were expressed at the
U.S.  producers.  A significant number of U.S. pro-  farm level, and
ducers would be expected  to fail or produce other  U.S.  QED = U.S. consumption of food peanuts (usu-
products with price Fp prevailing for all U.S. peanut  ally quota),
production.  U.S. QEX =  U.S. shipments of export peanuts (usually
Since Figure 4 is conceptual,  quantities traded are  additional),
not detailed. However,  the model indicates that U.S.  U.S.  QOL = the U.S. crush of peanuts,
production  would  fall,  U.S.  consumption  would  Row Qd  =  world  consumption  of peanuts not pro-
rise, ROW production (modeled as very elastic with  duced in the United States,
respect to price) would increase to satisfy increased  Row Qs = the supply of peanuts not produced in the
consumption  in  the United  States, and  ROW con-  United States,
sumption (modeled as inelastic) would decrease very  Others = seed and loss in U.S. domestic market (480
little. One unknown impact is whether the U.S. sup-  million pounds),
ply curve would shift to the right if domestic quota  U.S.  Qd  =  aggregate  demand  for  peanuts  in  the
is unrestricted.A  significant shift to new producers  United States,
is  not currently  expected  as  there  is  no observed  U.S. Qs = aggregate supply of peanuts in the United
interest in new production of additional export pea-  States,
nuts,  which  are  currently  unrestricted.  Ford  and  P = farm level price of peanuts.
Hewitt,  for  example,  have  shown  that  peanuts  at
current export prices will not compete with soybeans  The  first  three  equations  specify demand  in the
for farm production resources.  submarkets  shown in  Figures  1 and 2. Equation  4
This  model  is  essentially  a  model  of unilateral  specifies the aggregate U.S. demand, Figure 3. Equa-
trade liberalization  by the United States  and it de-  tions 5, 6, and 7 represent the U.S. supply and ROW
scribes the magnitude of the adjustment problem that  supply  and demand schedules  shown  in  Figure 4.
would accompany  unilateral  liberalization.  Impor-  Data  sources  for  disappearance,  price  levels,  and
tant questions  remain on the sources of the ROW  required elasticities are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
excess supply  and demand curves  facing the  U.S.  With respect  to demand  assumptions,  the export
market. Are the levels and elasticities of world excess  demand for U.S.  peanuts is retained in U.S. aggre-
supply and demand established under discriminatory  gate demand and held separate from world demand.
policy conditions  in other countries?  Marketing in  U.S. peanuts are believed to serve a unique, quality-
many countries that compete with the United States  oriented  market so that it is likely that the United
features  monopoly sales  by a central  board.  How  States would both import and export peanuts in a free
would liberalization of foreign policies affect supply  market. Imported peanuts would be mixed with U.S.
and demand?5 peanuts under quality controlled conditions and sig-
STRUCTURE OF A SIMtLATION RM~ODEL  nificant substitution would be expected.  All of the
demand elasticities used in the model were estimated
Using elasticities, prices, and observed supply and  in previous studies.
disappearance  of the  key  economic  variables  de-  Supply  elasticities  were  not  estimated  here  for
scribed in Figures 1-4, the following equations were  peanuts.  U.S.  supply was assumed to have an elas-
specified.  ticity  of .55,  based  on  an  estimate  for  soybeans
Simulation Model:  (Table 3)  (Sullivan et  al). In the peanut production
(1) U.S. QED  = f(P)  belt, soybeans and peanuts compete for similar land,
(2) U.S. QEX = f(P)  use similar capital and labor, and may have similar
(3)  U.S. QOL = f(P)  producer responses with respect to a given percent-
(4) U.S.  QD  = U.S.  QED  + U.S.  QEX  + U.S.  QOL  +  age change in price. The parameters of supply were
others  determined by elasticity and the average  weighted
(5)  U.S. Qs  = f(P)  price received by farmers in 1987 for production of
(6) Row Qd  = f(P)  3,619 million pounds of peanuts (Table 2). Since the
(7) Row Qs  = f(P) and  adoption  of a quota policy,  peanut production  has
(8) U.S. Qd + Row QD  = U.S. Qs  + Row Qs,  been responsive to price conditions. During the con-
tract period, farmers respond to the weighted average
5Research is under way by the senior author and the Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture,  to answer
some of these questions by describing some of the important policy forces at work in competing countries. PSE and CSE estimates
have been made for China,  India, and Senegal.  Eventually, a global analysis of trade liberalization might be possible.
159Table 2.  Prices and Quantities of Peanuts  Table 3.  Supply and Demand Elasticities for
Supplied and Demanded at the Farm  Peanuts at the Farm  Level
Level,  1987
United Statea  Rest of World United States  Rest of  World
United States  Rest of World  ___  Demand  Supply  Demand  Supply
.......  million pounds -Domestic
Supplied:  3,619 (US Qs)  1,653.3 (Row Qs)  Edible  -.25a  .55b  -.38  8.3
Demanded:  Oilseed  -.69e
Edible (quota)  2,065 (US QED)  1,653.3 (Row QD)  Export  -.25f
Export (additional)  685 (US  QEX)  Sources:
aCarley  and Fletcher, 1989.
Oil (domestic)  594 (US  QOL)  bSullivan  et al.,  1989.
CAuthor's  unpublished estimate.
-..-  -$ per pound  -- ---  dAuthor's  unpublished estimate.
~pr.  ~ice.  ~s:~  ~  0 ~eSullivan,  et al.,  1989.
Price':  'Assumed to be the same as domestic edibles.
Edible (quota)  .3076
Weighted Farm  MODEL RESULTS
Price  .277 ^^  ~  ~~~~~Price  .277  -Quantitative  results  from the model were consis-
Export (additional)  .180  .18  tent with the implications of Figure 4. The equilib-
Oil (domestic)  .140  - rium world price with free trade was estimated to be
$.1966 per pound at the farm level. Compared to the
Source: US Qs, US QED,  US QOL,  US QEX, are available  weighted  average  farm price  of $.277  per pound
in U.  S. Department  of Agriculture.  Oil Crops:  Situations  received in 1987, this implies an R  value of $.0804 i SJ  1- Roreceived in 1987, this implies an RV value of $.0804 and Outlook Yearbook. OCS-22, July,  1989. Row Qs =
QD are available in U.  S. Department of Agriculture.  per pond. The RV estimate compares with a rental
Foreign  Agriculture  Service. World Oilseed Situation  rate  of $.067  reported  by  Carley  from  a  random
and Market Highlights. Price estimates are the authors  sample of Georgia peanutfarmersin 1984. While the
estimates from  sample data collected from  unpublished 
files in  the U.  S.  Department of Agriculture and thee  e
Georgia Peanut Association.  pound were commonly  observed. Such close corre-
spondence of observed with computed value appears
to provide validation  of the model as the computed
RV  is  theoretically  a  description  of at  least  one
expected rental rate (the difference between the sub-
price offered for quota and additional peanuts and to  siized price  and the  supply price at  the free tade
the ratio of additional to quota peanuts that may be  equilibrium).  Equally  important  to producers,  the equilibrium).  Equally  important  to producers,  the
deliverable on the contract. model  shows  a  decline in  U.S.  peanut production
World supply was estimated to be extremely elas-  from 3,619 million pounds in 1987 to 3,041 million
tic, particularly with respect to the possible opening  pounds  with  free  trade.  The  loss  of 578  million
of the  U.S. market.  During the 1980 drought,  400  pounds  of production  and  the  collapse of the  RV
million pounds of peanuts were  almost instantane-  represents  a farm income  loss of $405 million per
ously diverted from world to U.S. markets when the  year (Table 4).
import ban  was temporarily  lifted. These peanuts,  A free-trade price of $.1966 per pound compared
mostly from China, were quickly and easily diverted  to the farm level price of $.18 per pound on the world
to the profitable U.S. market. Excess supply elastic-  market would indicate that U.S. exports have been
ity was projected to be 8.3 by the authors based on  taxed at a rate of $.0166 per pound. All consumers
expert opinion of brokers in the industry (Table 3).  of edible peanuts in the world market have received
The high elasticity of ROW excess supply probably  a similar subsidy, while world producers were im-
does not represent-farm level production  response,  plicitly taxed by the same amount. The subsidy for
but represents  response  of world  peanut handlers  U.S. consumers  of peanut oil would be $.0566 per
who are able to select additional high value peanuts  pound for U.S. farmers'  stock peanuts used for oil.
from a world supply that is almost 14 times greater  Since the U.S. oil market for U.S. peanuts has been
than U.S production. Also, in the case of China,  the  isolated from that of the rest of the world, this model
current policy  of the state marketing  board  would  sheds no light on the potential interdependence of oil
probably dictate diversion ofpeanuts from consump-  and edible (confectionery)  markets  in world  trade.
tion to export as a means of earning needed foreign  Expansion  of the model in that direction  would be
exchange.  appropriate.
160Table 4.  Effects in Major U.  S. Markets Resulting from Removing the U.  S. Peanut Program
Farm  Level Quantities  Farm Level Values
With Policies  Without Policies  Change  With Policies  Without Policies  Change
---..- --  million pounds ---------  ----  --- million pounds  -- --------
Imports  2  584  +582  a  114  NA
Production  3,619  3,041  -578  1,003  598  -405
Confection  2,065  2,251  +186  635  443  -192
Oil  594  428  -166  83  84  +1
Exports  685  669  -16  123  132  +9
aThe farm level value of imports depends on their source which was undetermined for this study.
Free  trade  would  reduce  U.S.  farmers'  peanuts  for India, and a substantial subsidy  in Senegal (40
going  into  the  oil  market by  166  million pounds  percent) in  1986 (Webb et al.). More recent studies
(Table  4).  About 428  million  pounds  of  peanuts  indicate  rapid  changes  taking  place  in  China.  A
would be crushed, and this use implicitly represents  forthcoming study by Miller and Webb will project
the destination  of low  quality  peanuts.  Although  the peanut subsidy in China.
quality is  not explicit  in  the  model,  including  the  The net effect of U.S. liberalization on non-U.S.
demand  of U.S.  oil,  which  normally  uses  lower  producers and U.S. consumers would be positive, but
quality peanuts,  would  allow this  effect  to  be re-  U.S. producer  losses would be much more concen-
flected in the analysis. In a similar manner,  leaving  trated  than  U.S.  consumer gains evaluated  at farm
U.S. export demand in the U.S. aggregate demand,  level prices. Consumer outlays would decrease 192
rather than as a part of world excess demand, would  million dollars  for  increased  consumption  of U.S.
recognize that U.S. runner peanuts serve a possibly  edible  products  (Table 4).  The  average  per capita
unique segment of world demand and that the United  decrease in outlay for 230 million consumers would
States will probably continue to export near the 1987  be $.84  per year in farm-level  value. Fewer farmers
level. However,  the United  States would import at  than consumers would be affected. Based on a popu-
least 584  million pounds  to satisfy  increased  U.S.  lation of 19,540 peanut farms in 1987, and a loss of
consumption at lower prices. Although not specified  405 million dollars, the average loss would be about
in  this  model,  many  imported  peanuts  might  be  $21,000 per farm per year. These losses would occur
forecasted  to go to the oil market.  mainly in Georgia,  North  Carolina,  and Alabama
U.S. consumption of confectionery peanuts would  (Table 5).
increase,  in  the  model,  by  186 million  pounds  to
2,251  million pounds,  and U.S.  exports  would  re-  Table 5.  Number  of Peanut Farms by State in
main  nearly unchanged,  dropping  only  16  million  1982 and  1987
pounds to 665 million pounds (Table 4). Inelasticity
is expected in ROW excess demand where the model  STATE  1982  1987
projects a drop in consumption of 58 million pounds  Alabama  3,291  2,655
as a result of a higher free-trade price.  973  7067
The RV wedge of $.0804 per pound compares with  o
a weighted average support price received in 1987 of  Florida  1,201  1,133
$.277 per pound to yield a PSE of 29 percent. This  Virginia  1,501  1,150
is  considerably  higher  than  the  PSE of  8 percent  North Carolina  3,809  3,038
measured for soybeans using standard methods that
accept existing international prices as prevalent after  Oklahoma  1,290  1,088
U.S.  liberalization.  Dairy,  sugar,  and  most  grain  Texas  2,412  2,060
PSEs  were  significantly  higher  (40-70  percent),  Others  1569  13
while livestock PSEs  were  generally  lower (7-26).
The aggregate PSE for all agricultural commodities  Total  22,646  19,540
in the United States was 33 percent for 1987 (Webb  Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
et al.). PSEs for peanuts in other countries, measured  Census, Washington, D.C.
by conventional  means, indicate  a substantial tax in
China (71  percent of producer revenue),  near zero
161CONCLUSIONS  for increased consumption of U.S. edible products
This study emphasized dollar values of trade flows  (Table 4).  The average per capita decrease in outlay
resulting  from  unilateral  trade  liberalization.  for 230 million consumers would be $.84 per year in
Changes in trade flow in the peanut oil market would  farm level value. In comparison to consumers, fewer
yield practically no benefits to U. S.  oil consumers.  farmers would be affected. Based on a population of
These  consumers  are  now subsidized  by the  dis-  19,540  peanut  farms  in  1987,  and  a  loss  of 405
criminatory low prices of peanuts for oil. Production  million  dollars,  the  average  loss  would  be  about
and use of peanuts for oil would fall by 166 million  $21,000 per farm per year. These losses would occur
pounds  (farmers' stock)  and prices would rise with  mainly in Georgia,  North Carolina,  and Alabama.
liberalization,  leaving  outlays  for  farmers'  stock  (Table 5).
about  equal  to  the  $83  million under  the  current  The major impact would occur in Georgia which
policy (Table 4). Likewise, there would be very little  had 36 percent of peanut farms in 1987. A continued
dollar  impact  in the export  market.  Export prices  fall in  total  farm  numbers  would  likely  result.  A
would rise as U. S. exports fall, and the inelasticity  decrease in resource use  (farms)  by a country  that
of demand would  result in  only  about $9  million  increases  imports  (peanuts)  is  consistent  with the
increase in value of farmers' stock peanuts (Table 4).  theory  of comparative  advantage.  For comparative
By far, the most significant  impacts would occur  advantage to succeed,resce  resources  released  from pea-
in  the  U.S.  domestic  market  where  582  million  nut  production  are  expected  to  be  reemployed  in
pounds of imports are expected to replace 578 mil-  expanded export of some other product. Unilateral
lion  pounds  of U.S.  production.  The expected  in-  liberalization does not provide these opportunities.
crease in world  price levels would be beneficial  to  Thus, there must be sontinued emphasis on negotia-
non-U.S. producers, and the consequent fall in U.S.  tions,  such  as  GATT, that  insure  that  multilateral
prices would benefit U.S. consumers. U.S. producers  trade flows  are enhanced.  Perhaps  GATT negotia-
losses would be much more concentrated than U.S.  tions would be better received  if more specific  eco-
consumer gains evaluated at farm level prices. Con-  nomic  analysis  of multilateral  effects  could  be
sumer outlays  would  decrease  192  million dollars  provided to negotiators.
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